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Abstract: 
 
Purpose:  The aim of this study is to provide knowledge to manage the holistic nature of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Design/Methodology/ Approach: The theoretical framework of COVID-19 research forms a 
matrix of multidiscipline scientists from medics, epidemiologists, sociologists, economists, 
and full life cycle performance. This ground level creates systemic risk in form of White 
Swan. The next layer are costs of pandemic private, public, club, merit costs. This is Black 
Swan model of COVID-19 pandemic as systemic risk. In the top layer we see Green Swan 
and pure uncertainty.  Each of the elements of a Systemic Matrix is different in every 
country.  
Findings: In our opinion, COVID-19 pandemic should be described in the language of 
systemic risk. There is uncertainty if nature of COVID-19 is endogenous or exogenous? The 
matrix of COVID-19 understanding is crowned by well-being and the perception of the risk 
of COVID-19 among the various participants in the economy.  
Practical Implications: Knowing that COVID-19 pandemic is Green Swan we may use 
Resolution Funds to support Public-Private network for testing and vaccines.  
Originality/value: Our theoretical language opens cross disciplinary communication on 
COVID-19 pandemic. Now, we can discuss on distribution of cost of COVID-19 pandemic 
between participants of this multilevel systemic process. This is also cost of blocked 
transgenerational transfers. Some people lost life, some lost social capital because of the 
loss of grandparents.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Traditional systemic risk management relies on scenario-based evaluations and 
analyses of policymaker interference. This popular approach is based on expert 
opinion and is relatively easy to implement. On the other hand, modern systemic 
risk management is based on gigantic databases collected on IT platforms. In this 
case, the opinions of experts merely supplement the overall management of systemic 
risk, which in fact uses information from both structured quantitative sources and 
unstructured semantic sources such as social media. In this way, in managing the 
systemic risk of a pandemic, we skip smoothly from an intuitive search for an 
analogy to the existing situation over to risk assessment based on qualitative 
expertise supported by econometric models. 
 
Currently, the systemic risk management of a pandemic is based on basic risk 
indicators (such as the number of people who severe disease compared with the 
number of people who have recovered) along with some more detailed indications 
(such as the number of people discharged from and the number of people admitted 
to such and such a hospital). Then, we are still left with an analysis of unstructured 
data related to citizens’ emotions. In the long run, it will be possible to monitor the 
pandemic via an integrated, holistic system of systemic risk management. 
 
There are two approaches to managing systemic risk. One is passive and assumes 
that each market failure or anomaly is individual and unique. However, in practice 
they are well described by the statistics of normal distribution and the value at risk 
method. In the second approach, the context of applying universal methods of risk 
management means that they have to be applied while taking into account the 
possibility that events may occur that are highly unlikely yet cause huge losses. 
These types of events are called black swans. Epidemiologists were prepared for the 
fact that sooner or later a ‘pandemic of the century’ would emerge (Gates 2020). In 
the language of risk management, ‘systemic’ means that the appearance of a ‘green 
swan’ was expected. Table 1 compares the concepts of white, black and green 
swans. 
 
Table 1. A typology of swans: similarities and differences 





distribution   
Tail risks, perhaps non-
Gaussian. Ex-post rational 
explanation, after 
occurrence 
Highly likely or certain occurrence 
but uncertain timing of occurrence 
and materialisation. Too complex 







analysts and risk managers 
with some disagreement 
Scientists, disagreement with 
many economists and financial 
analysis 






Impacts Low or moderate Massive and direct mostly 
material. Possible 
correction of damages 
after event 
Massive and direct impact mostly 
to human lives (or even 
civilisational). Irreversibility of 




Risk models are 




to risk. Learn from event 
to design anti-fragile 
strategies. 
Given severity of effects, even 
without full understanding, need 
for immediate action and 
coordination under radical 
uncertainty 
Source: Silva 2020 p. 6. 
 
Each form of systemic thinking about far-reaching and interrelated changes is 
similar to others on a continuum ranging from full knowledge to full uncertainty and 
ignorance. Each concept of risk is illustrated respectively by: the white swan for 
systematic risk and seasonal flu, the black swan for endogenous systemic risk and 
global financial crisis, and the green swan for exogenous or endogenous systemic 
risk and the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
The hidden elements of the white, black and green swan concept are its two 
dimensions. The first concerns the ability to survive: prevention, accepting losses, 
sharing them among the stakeholders, and adapting to the new normality. The 
second dimension involves the phases of systemic risk management: defining the 
context of the shock that threatens the continuation of the system, the multiplier of 
disruptions, their critical points, recognising the systemic nature of the disturbances, 
introducing preventative measures to avoid moral hazard, risk reduction by dividing 
it up, risk trading, and the conscious aggravation of risk so that it might eventually 
become a political risk. Table 2 uses the white, black and green swan division to 
describe strategies to combat the COVID-19 pandemic in selected countries. 
 
Table 2. Traditional and modern methods of managing the systemic risk of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in selected countries 




(we'll wait and see) 
Green Swan 
(we’ll get ahead of the 
situation) 
Nature Belarus 
 (God's indulgence) 
Sweden, Mexico (herd 
immunity: "it's not 
worse than the flu") 
Poland (incidence rate 
test scale derivative) 
Bioengineering Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea, 
Japan (masks and 
tests) 
China (isolation) 
United States Poland (incidence rate 
test scale derivative) 
Germany (redundant 
intensive care potential) 
Source: Solarz, Waliszewski 2020. 
 




A COVID-19 risk perception study in 10 countries (United Kingdom, United States, 
Australia, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Mexico, Japan, South Korea) revealed 
that it was perceived as high between January and April 2020, with 4.78–5.45 on a 7 
point scale. It was more socio-economic and psychological than medical. Trust 
capital, pro-social orientation and personal experience with epidemics were of 
particular importance. Those with their own experiences of living in times of 
pestilence as well as carers were more emotionally affected. For example, in South 
Korea and Spain, trust in state authorities lowered the subjective sense of risk 
(Dryhurst et al., 2020). 
 
Recovery and adaptation in the aftermath of disruptions is a requirement for 
interconnected 21st Century economic, industrial, social, and health-based systems, 
and resilience is an increasingly crucial part of strategies to avid systemic collapse.  
This strategy includes: 
 
1. Design systems, including infrastructure, supply chains, economic, financial and 
public health systems, to be resilient, i.e. recoverable and adaptable. 
2. Develop methods for quantifying resilience so that trade–offs between a 
system’s efficiency and resilience can be made explicit and guide investments. 
3. Control system complexity to minimise cascading failures resulting from 
unexpected disruption by decoupling unnecessary connections across 
infrastructure and make necessary connections controllable and visible. 
4. Manage system topology by designing appropriate connection and 
communications across interconnected infrastructure. 
5. Add resources and redundancies in system-crucial components to ensure 
functionality. 
6. Develop real-time decision support tools integrating data and automating 
selection of management alternatives based on explicit policy trade-off in real 
time (Hynes, Linkov, and Trump, 2020). 
 
The proposed map of the risk accompanying the COVID-19 pandemic enables the 
methods of combating it to be individualised. Instead of life or death, economic 
activity or contagion strategies, a win-win type of strategy is proposed – that is, to 
protect everyone’s life without exception while people remain professionally active 
during the pandemic. For analyses along the lines of something-for-something, the 
discounted value of further human life is used. At the same time, in order to make a 
valuation, the value of the potential consumption of the deceased is calculated. To 
simplify the calculation, it is assumed that a year of life is worth 6 years of its annual 
consumption (Hall, Jones, and Klenow 2020). Then, the effectiveness of the subsidy 
policy for the survival of enterprises or the cost of the financial policy aimed at 
restoring effective demand is examined (Boissay, Rees, and Rungcharoenkitkul 
2020). 
 






Individually, people value health more than wealth. The extent to which such 
preferences translate into a change in health and financial habits varies widely. 
Mortality and interpretation statistics are a key element (Heap, Koop, Matakos, 
Unan, and Weber 2020). In the media, mortality is shown on logarithmic scales. 
Public communication takes place on linear scales. They are correctly interpreted by 
the majority of citizens. The linear scales show the development of the pandemic 
uncontrolled, the logarithmic scale flattens the illness curve, and so the linear scale 
evokes concern in the constituents (Romano, Sotis, Dominioni, and Guidi 2020). 
 
We can limit the role of such rhetoric by demanding more precise language that 
quantifies risk on an absolute scale, effectively assigning “micromort” as a unit of 
risk defined as one-in-a-million chance of death. While the quantification of risk and 
its uncertainties is scientific, perception of acceptable risk is subject to personal 
judgment that will vary with life experience and factors such as whether the risk is 
voluntary or not (Roberts, 2013). 
 
If individuals come to believe that the virus is more infectious, then they upwardly 
revise their assessment of the probability that they will get the virus even if they 
socially distance. But if individuals come to believe that they are likely to get the 
virus no matter what they do, then they may decide to ignore social distancing 
measures: in other words, we encounter a rational “fatalism effect” (Akesson, 
Ashworth-Hayes, Hanh, Mecalfe, and Rasool 2020). 
 
Perceived personal health risks associated with Covid-19 fall sharply with age.  
Younger people have far higher assessments of Covid 19 health risks, for 
themselves as well as for others, than older people (Bordalo, Coffman, Gennnioli, 
and Shleifer 2020). The provision of timely, regularly updated and comparable 
granular data on excess mortality by national and international statistical agencies 
should be high on the agenda (Aron and Muellbauer 2020). 
The holistic concept of the COVID-19 pandemic must simultaneously take into 
account its three dimensions. The first is a reduction in mortality among those 
infected with the coronavirus. The second is to ensure conditions for the 
continuation of life in circumstances of health and financial security. The third is 
building social capital and well-being in the circumstances of a new normality 
(Lustig, Stone, and Tommasi, 2020). 
 
The basic problem associated with the COVID-19 pandemic is putting it in the right 
cognitive framework, starting with its time and space. Table 3 presents the cognitive 
framework of the COVID-19 pandemic. Goods and services differ in terms of the 








Table 3. Cognitive framework of the COVID-19 pandemic 
Time\space  Closed space Open space 
Time-saving technologies Epidemiological tests Applications monitoring the 
epidemiological distance 
Time-consuming technologies Outbreaks of plague Epidemiological coma 
(Lockdown) 
Source: Own study.  
 
Manufacturing and services are supported by remote work (saving time spent in 
direct contact) or face-to-face contacts. Production and services are provided in 
virtual (open) or closed space. The COVID-19 virus spreads particularly vigorously 
in confined spaces. Screening tests to determine who is infected are crucial in this 
environment. 
The scale of losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic put it on a par with the 
global financial crisis (GFC) in terms of systemic risk. The post-pandemic recession 
differs significantly from the GFC. Firstly, it is truly exogenous in nature and not 
due to economic imbalances brought to light. Secondly, it creates uncertainty rather 
than measurable risk. The source of risk is non-economic factors. Thirdly, it has a 
truly global reach. There is practically no country unaffected by the COVID-19 
pandemic. A methodologically correct methodology for comparing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of fighting the COVID19 pandemic must take into account the 
economic goods in which its costs are calculated. 
 
Analyses have thus far focused on the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for 
the public finance sector. The prospect of inventing an effective vaccine in 
circumstances of anti-vaccine protests is a reminder of the importance of public 
goods for health and financial security. In practice, for resident taxpayers there is a 
choice between intergenerational transfers or privatising the costs of a pandemic. 
 
South Korea’s success in the struggle against the COVID-19 pandemic shows that 
the supply of applications that track contact between people during the pandemic, 
i.e. coexisting goods (digitisation), are an ally of decision-makers looking for 
solutions beneficial to all stakeholders. 
 
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic as a systemic risk 
requires that losses incurred in all types of public goods affecting all the 
stakeholders of this process be recognised as costs, with their differentiation in time 
and space. A pandemic can impact an economy in many ways: reductions in 
people’s willingness to work, dictations in consumption patterns and lower 
consumption, added stress on the financial system and greater uncertainty leading to 
lower investment. These are respectively referred to as (labor) supply shocks, 
demand shocks, financial shocks and uncertainty shocks (Lin and Meissner, 2020). 






A natural question is whether individual behaviour is the most desirable based on 
social criteria or the aggregation of the costs and benefits of each individual’s 
behaviour for all people (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2003). 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the World Health Organization’s announcement of a 
pandemic has focused the attention of researchers on determining whether we are 
dealing with a known or a new coronavirus. Attempts have been made to establish 
the actual mortality and where it has characteristics of excess mortality. Who to 
protect first? Who should be allowed to work directly at their place of work? It was 
quickly established that no pharmaceuticals are available to limit the rate of 
coronavirus spread, so all that remained were changes in social distancing. The 
pandemic was recognised as being spread from one person to another by airborne 
droplets. 
 
An lockdown froze the labour market and severed service and manufacturing links 
in the global economy. In practice, the weaknesses of having transformed China into 
a world factory were acknowledged. The global financial crisis began to be 
compared with the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic (Breitenfellner and 
Ramskogler, 2020). Publications questioned the legitimacy of comparing the 
COVID-19 pandemic with the global financial crisis (Danielsson, Macrae, Vayanos, 
and Zigrand, 2020). It is pointed out that this time the banks are part of the solution 
to the problem and are not creating a spontaneous shock for the economy and 
society (Strauss-Kahan 2020). Currently, review articles have emerged comparing 
different types of pandemics (68 Flu, SARS 2003, H1N1, MERS 2012, Ebola 2014, 
Zika 2016) and their socio-economic consequences (Ma, Rogers, and Zhou, 2020]. 
 
3. The Problem Statement, Objectives and Research Hypotheses  
 
The scale of losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is comparable to the losses 
caused by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Under these circumstances, our 
description of the COVID -19 pandemic refers to the achievements of research on 
systemic risk management. 
 
The main hypothesis of the study is that the COVID -19 pandemic is a manifestation 
of exogenous or endogenous systemic risk (Green Swan). Following on from this, 
auxiliary hypotheses were formulated that delaying the recognition of the epidemic 
as a pandemic involves losses of approx. 2% of GDP for each week of delay. 
 
Another supporting hypothesis states that how the losses caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic are financed will determine the new epidemiological normality in the 
world. 
 




4. Risk Accumulation – Transformation of Partial Risk into Systemic Risk 
 
The COVID 19 pandemic risk matrix has two dimensions. The first concerns 
survivability. The second involves the successive phases of managing a pandemic as 
a systemic risk.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is of major significance to the insurance sector when 
considering the contractual coverage of health risks and mortality. These impacts are 
multifaceted, and some positive effects counterbalance the drawbacks. While for 
well-managed insurers the pandemic is not a “black swan”, it is significant when 
coupled with changes in financial assets and interest rates. A situation where 
insurance can be purchased against force majeure, as we are currently experiencing, 
may be perceived as maturity on the part of those who manage systemic risk, in this 
case the COVID-19 pandemic. The far-reaching impact of COVID-19 requires 
constant vigilance from both regulators and insurers. In the post-pandemic phase, the 
emergency measures currently in place will have to be developed through a carefully 
designed exit strategy that, while maintaining sound risk management practices, will 
safeguard the  
Life insurance retracted to levels (premiums collected relative to GDP) found 35 
years ago in the United States and Japan, and 20-25 years in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Switzerland. Only new products, considering price discounts for a 
healthy lifestyle and assistance for people suffering from senile dementia, can 
reverse the situation (Addressing ..., 2020). 
 
A chain of relationships can be laid out between the various aspects of the overall 
COVID-19 crisis. Epidemiological phenomena are of a primary nature. We can 
neither protect ourselves against the appearance of the virus nor effectively combat 
its spread. This led to a medical collapse and a humanitarian disaster on a whole new 
scale. This, in turn, translated into an unprecedented global economic crisis. The 
next significant link in this chain of events is the political consequences. 
 
The real “new normal” following the pandemic will emerge when insurers offer a 
whole range of insurance products resulting from the coexistence of society and the 
economy with the risk of contracting the coronavirus. The question remains as to 
who will ultimately pay for the losses caused by COVID-19. The answer to this 
question largely determines whether it will be possible to prevent further 
humanitarian disaster and to stand together to cover the costs connected with the 
materialisation of systemic risk (Jenny, 2020). 
 
Optimistic scenarios for the unfolding of events include inventing a vaccine for the 
coronavirus, minimizing the side effects of a COVID-19 vaccination, developing 
herd immunization against this pandemic, isolating infected individuals from the 
healthy population. Realists remind us that there is no cure for AIDS, SARS or 






MERS, there are no vaccines for many epidemiological diseases, there is no 
certainty that such a thing as herd immunisation exists, there is no evidence of 
human solidarity (Beinhocker 2020).  
 
5. Discussion and Limitations 
 
The attempt to combine the achievements of epidemiologists and systemic risk 
management specialists is a pioneering endeavour. The search for functional 
equivalents of the concept of systemically important institutions ends in most cases 
with intensive care units and the number of ventilators offering artificial respiration 
for patients. The next step in this direction should be prevention and screening, 
whereby the key issue is to perform tests on a large scale. In this regard, the 
institutions of systemic importance should be laboratories authorised to verify other 
results. 
 
An outcome of research on financial system risk is the recognition of panic as a 
factor of systemic importance. Not only emotions lie at its source, but nowadays 
software or supervisory regulations play a role too. The fact that individual 
behaviour is systemically important has been rediscovered by epidemiologists who 
are tasked with reducing systemic risk without vaccines and drugs. 
 
More research is needed on the systemic importance of individuals’ health and 
financial habits in terms of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Technologies of 
person to person and B2B direct virtual contact have their place in the formation of 
herd behaviour. This line of research requires further development. A certain 
shortcoming of our research is the omission in the quality analysis of systemic risk 
management by local government units. Financial systems are highly centralised and 
the spatial dimension is sometimes overlooked in their analysis. In the event of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the quality of management in a given local government unit is 
absolutely crucial when it comes to how far the epidemic spreads. The pandemic 
response needs to be a holistic one, combined with an improved data ecosystem 
between the public health system and the community. 
 
During COVID-19 pandemic, a scapegoat was sought, as it was in the global 
financial crisis. Non-bank financial intermediaries (shadow banking) were held to 
account for the risk incurred by the financial system; for the pandemic risk in many 
countries, the private health service became the scapegoat, which contributed 
significantly to the soaring death rate among the residents of old people’s homes. 
 
The experience of the financial sector has shown that the stigmatized non-bank 
financial intermediaries have grown by 50% in the decade separating us from the 
global financial crisis. Therefore, one should talk about public-private partnership in 
the health care system, and not limit postulation to either a public or a private 
system. Mixed public and private health systems all too often lead to what is known 




as public service cannibalism, with the best staff moving from public to private 
health. Intellectual property is patented more effectively in the private health sector. 
The moral hazard of a hybrid health system requires a clear definition of their 
domains, without considering one form better than the other. 
 
The quality of the statistics poses a serious limitation to the analysis performed. 
Despite uniform standards from the World Health Organization, the coronavirus 
mortality statistics are unreliable and difficult to compare. It would seem to be in the 
interest of mankind to introduce a global service to determine the causes of deaths 
and indicate the systemic threat to humanity. The appointment by the G20 countries 
of the Financial Stability Council was just such a step towards establishing services 
responsible for monitoring systemic risk on a global scale. Our concept of the 
pandemic shall move to an interdisiplinary science, with an integrated approach of 
medical sciences and public health with medical research and development, financial 
science, diplomacy, biomedical science, big data, information technology, artificial 
intelligence, statistics, metoreology, biotechnology, ecology and social sciences – all 





COVID-19 is a manifestation of a green swan, a phenomenon that will materialise 
sooner or later and generate huge external costs for humanity. As soon as the green 
swan emerges, we ask ourselves if the price we are paying for rationalising 
healthcare might be too high. In this case, we are choosing literally between human 
survival and the habits of ostentatious consumption. The COVID-19 pandemic 
continues. Its development in the language of systemic risk management is 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Milestones in the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 Name  Key words 
1. Context Decoupling of system and lifeworld 
2. Shock COVID-19 
3. Multiplier Tourism, mass events, closed facilities 
4. A turning point High mortality of infected seniors a 
5. Acceptance State of the pandemic 
6. Prevention Epidemiological distance, protective masks 
7. Reduction Immediate freezing of interpersonal contacts in the 
public sphere 
8. Transfer Postponement, regulatory arbitration 
9. Increasing the scale of systemic risk New normalcy 
a The methodology of COVID-19 death statistics raises serious questions. Official figures are 
estimated at 25-30% of the actual statistics [Jinjarak i in., 2020] 
Source: Own work. 
 






Each time we encounter a systemic risk, we face the choice of either to rebuild the 
past reality, which will sooner or later rematerialise the systemic risk, or to seek a 
so-called new normality. 
 
Our collective memory is not able to refresh the experience of one hundred years 
ago and the devastation caused by the “Spanish” flu. Such extreme experiences 
require the search for new analogies. Applying the achievements of research on 
financial system risk to analyse the COVID-19 pandemic opens up new ways of 
combating the external costs of the globalisation of the economy and the functioning 
of humanity. We learned 10 years ago that we need to look at how the system as a 
whole has performed under duress and whether and how it might be strengthened. 
Focussing on the resilience of one or another element without understanding its 
broader effect will yield a false picture.  
 
Another lesson learned from the global financial crisis was that monetary and fiscal 
policies must be coordinated. This underscores the importance of coordinated 
economic and public health responses. While at present the goal of enforced 
measures is to slow down the development of the epidemic so that the number of 
patients that require intensive care is within the capacity of the healthcare system, at 
some point the quarantine period has to end. The estimated infection fatality rate is 
close to zero for children and younger adults, but rises exponentially with age, 
reaching about 0,3% for those aged between 50–59, 1% for 60-69, 4% for 70–79, 
and 24% for people aged 80 and above. The age-dependent contact matrices are 
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